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Emerging market financial crises are abrupt and dramatic, usually occurring
after a period of high output growth, massive capital flows, and a boom in asset
markets. This thesis develops an equilibrium asset pricing model with informational
frictions in which vulnerability and the crisis itself are consequences of the investor
optimism in the period preceding the crisis. The model features two sets of investors,
domestic and foreign. Both sets of investors are imperfectly informed about the true
state of the emerging economy. Investors learn from noisy signals which contain
information relevant for asset returns and formulate expectations, or “beliefs”, about
the state of productivity.
Numerical analysis shows that, if preceded by a sequence of positive signals, a
small, negative noise shock can trigger a sharp downward adjustment in investors’
beliefs, asset prices, and consumption. The magnitude of this downward adjust-
ment and sensitivity to negative signals increase with the level of optimism attained
prior to the negative signal. The model calibrated to a typical emerging market
economy, Turkey, reveals that with the introduction of incomplete information asset
prices display persistent effects in response to transitory shocks, and the volatility
of consumption increases by 2.1 percentage points.
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s parameters using U.S. data
documents that the estimated signal-to-noise ratio for the U.S. is higher since, unlike
Turkey, a significantly higher portion of fluctuations can be accounted for by changes
in the persistent component rather than the noise. Feeding these two different
signal-to-noise ratios to the model, we find that the booms and busts driven by
misperceptions of the investors have significantly lower frequency, magnitude, and
duration in the case of U.S. compared to Turkey.
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...That this region [East Asia] might become embroiled in one of the worst
financial crises in the postwar period was hardly ever considered-within
or outside the region-a realistic possibility. What went wrong? Part of
the answer seems to be that these countries became victims of their own
success. This success had led domestic and foreign investors to underes-
timate the countries economic weaknesses. It had also, partly because of
the large scale financial inflows that it encouraged, increased the demands
on policies and institutions, especially but not only in the financial sec-
tor; and policies and institutions had not kept pace. The fundamental
policy shortcomings and their ramifications were fully revealed only as
the crisis deepened... IMF (1998)
The experience of the last decade suggests that emerging capital markets are
vulnerable to significant shifts in investors’ confidence in both upward and downward
directions. Downward shifts in confidence and financial market collapses are abrupt
and often take place unexpectedly after a large boom. Table 1.1 documents the
magnitude of these booms for several pre-crisis episodes: Argentina and Mexico in
1994, Korea in 1997, and Turkey in 2000. Taking Turkey as an example, the year
before its financial crisis in 2001, the country boasted an average quarterly current
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account-to-GDP ratio of -5.1%, private consumption growth of 4.5%, an increase in
equity prices of 57% and GDP growth of 3%.1
It is widely agreed that overconfidence and informational problems are at
least partially responsible for recent crisis episodes, as the above opening quote by
International Monetary Fund on the Asian crisis suggests. Whether these frictions
in international capital markets can be large enough to explain pre-crisis periods of
bonanza and the depth of the crises remains an open question.
In this thesis, we aim to answer this question by studying the quantitative
predictions of a model in which optimism, due to investors’ underestimation of
the weaknesses of emerging economies, acts as the driving force behind both the
pre-crisis booms and the vulnerability that paves the way to financial turmoil and
deep recessions. In the model, the pre-crisis bonanza is driven by a sequence of
positive signals that investors interpret as an improvement in the true fundamentals
of the economy. The crisis occurs as a sudden downward adjustment in investors’
expectations of the true fundamentals is triggered and their optimism suddenly
fades. Furthermore, the magnitude of the adjustment increases with the level of
optimism attained prior to the crisis.
The informational frictions that are the key ingredient of the model, are likely
to be prevalent in emerging markets for several reasons. One is the lack of trans-
parency in policy-making, and data reporting which manifests itself in the form of
inaccurate or misleading data. In a report, the International Monetary Fund argued
1Calvo and Reinhart (2000) conclude that “Sudden Stops,” sharp negative reversals of capital
flows, are usually preceded by a surge in capital inflows.
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Table 1.1: Magnitudes of pre-crisis booms.
Episode GDP (%) Consumption (%) Equity Price (%) CA/GDP (%)
Argentina, 1994Q1-Q4 1.72 2.67 12.97 -1.08
Mexico, 1994Q1-Q4 3.43 6.69 18.53 -2.00
Korea, 1996Q4-1997Q3 3.67 5.14 1.04 -3.69
Turkey, 2000Q1-Q4 3.08 4.51 57.30 -5.12
Average quarterly changes in GDP, private consumption, equity prices and average quarterly
current account-to-GDP ratios. GDP, and consumption are in constant prices, equity prices are
in local currencies and are deflated using the CPI. Source: International Financial Statistics and
corresponding countries’ central banks.
that this was a common thread running through several recent crisis episodes:
... A lack of transparency was a feature of the build-up to the Mexican
crisis of 1994-95 and of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. In these
crises, markets were kept in the dark about important developments
and became first uncertain and then unnerved as a host of interrelated
problems came to light. Inadequate economic data, hidden weaknesses
in financial systems, and a lack of clarity about government policies and
policy formulation contributed to a loss of confidence that ultimately
threatened to undermine global stability ...(2001)
A second reason informational frictions pose particular challenges for emerging
economies is the existence of high fixed costs associated with obtaining country-
specific information and keeping up with the developments in emerging economies,
as suggested by Calvo (1999). Such costs could arise due to idiosyncrasies affecting
financial markets in these countries, including for example, each country’s unique
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institutions, policies, political environment, legal structure, etc. In addition, it might
be optimal for international investors not to “buy” this information. Calvo and
Mendoza (2000) provide two arguments for why this can be the case. First, if short
selling positions are limited, the benefit of paying for costly information declines
as the number of emerging economies in which to invest becomes sufficiently large.
Second, if punishment for poor performance is high, managers of investment funds
may choose to mimic each other’s behavior instead of paying for costly information.
The model in this thesis features two types of investors, domestic and for-
eign, both of whom trade a single emerging market asset. Domestic investors are
consumer-investors who maximize the expected present discounted value of their
lifetime utility. Foreign investors specialize in trading the emerging market asset,
face trading costs, and maximize the expected present discounted value of profits
from investing. We model the informational frictions as follows. Both sets of in-
vestors are imperfectly informed about the true state of current productivity, which
contains information relevant for predicting future returns on the emerging market
asset. They can only partially infer the true state of productivity by “learning” from
publicly observed dividends (or signals) and, they share the same information set.
The dividends consist of two parts: a persistent component, which we interpret as
“true productivity”, and a transitory component, which is a noise term that controls
the accuracy of the signals. Modeled in this way, dividends serve an informational
role since a dividend payment is a noisy signal that contains information about
current and future realizations of productivity. Every period, foreign and domestic
investors observe dividends, solve a signal extraction problem, and “learn” about
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productivity by updating their expectations or “beliefs” regarding true productivity.
When investors turn pessimistic (optimistic), asset prices are driven below
(above) the “fundamentals price,” which is defined as the expected present dis-
counted value of dividends conditional on full information. In these periods, asset
prices and domestic investors’ consumption display swings that are not associated
with changes in true productivity. We find that a sequence of positive signals can
cause a boom in both the asset market and in consumption, and can be a source
of economic vulnerability if true productivity is in fact low. If a negative signal is
realized at the peak of a boom of this nature and, as a result, “challenges” current
prevailing beliefs, an abrupt and large downward adjustment in asset prices and
consumption takes place. If, however, the same signal “confirms” prevailing beliefs,
its impact is smaller.2
Foreign and domestic investors trade due to differences in their objective func-
tions particularly their risk aversions, but not for speculation (given that they have
the same beliefs). From the domestic investors’ perspective, dividend shocks are
important for two reasons. First, in order to intertemporally smooth consumption
domestic investors would like to increase (decrease) their asset position in response
to positive (negative) dividend shocks. Second, they play a critical informational
role. In response to a negative dividend shock, changes in expectations due to the
new information compounds the first effect, and as result, domestic investors reduce
their demand for the emerging market asset. Foreign investors also reduce their
2Moore and Schaller (2002) establish the state dependence of responses to noisy signals. We
borrow our terminology from them.
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demand for the asset in response to this shock, since they receive a negative signal
regarding future productivity. In equilibrium, we find that domestic investors’ de-
mand decreases by more than that of their foreign counterparts, therefore, domestic
investors become net sellers in response to a negative dividend shock. This result
leads to a procyclical current account on average. However, we also find that for
a given dividend shock, the higher the expectations about future productivity, the
lower are the domestic investors’ asset holdings since higher expectations induce
foreign investors to bid more aggressively, compared to their risk-averse domestic
counterparts, for the same asset. Hence, the higher the investment optimism, the
more the emerging economy can attract foreign investment, and therefore the more
likely the country is to develop a potentially sizable current account deficit. For
a given dividend shock, the model can thus produce a current account deficit and
booms in consumption and asset prices if investors are “sufficiently optimistic”.
The numerical analysis shows that with the introduction of informational fric-
tions, the volatility of the emerging economy’s consumption increases by 2 percent-
age points compared to the “full information” setup. Uncertainty about true cur-
rent productivity leads to increased uncertainty regarding future asset returns and a
more volatile consumption profile for the risk averse domestic investors. Moreover,
informational frictions produce persistence in response to transitory noise shocks.
If investors turn pessimistic (optimistic) in response to a misleading signal, it takes
several periods for them to correct their beliefs. The mechanism behind this re-
sult is the Bayesian learning process: the posteriors of one period are used in the
calculation of the following period’s priors.
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We calibrate the benchmark incomplete information model and pin down the
signal-to-noise ratio using Turkish GDP data. Conducting the same calibration ex-
ercise with U.S. data reveals that the signal-to-noise ratio for this country is signifi-
cantly higher, confirming that informational frictions are more prevalent in emerging
market economies rather than the developed. The calibration exercise conducting
using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure similar to Hamilton (1989) al-
lows us to quantify this difference. The model calibrated for Turkey generates more
frequent, larger and longer booms and busts driven by investors’ misperceptions
compared to U.S.
This thesis is at the crossroads of two main strands of literature. The first
is the literature on Sudden Stops and financial crises in open economies, and the
second is that on informational frictions in finance. Most existing models of financial
crises and Sudden Stops, focus on crash episodes, but not on the booms preceding
the crashes that might indeed contain the seeds of the financial crises. In contrast,
the model proposed in this thesis accounts for the boom-bust cycles observed in
emerging markets. Studies explaining Sudden Stops focus on financial frictions and
often utilize collateral constraints, (see, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Paasche (2001), or Mendoza and Smith (2004)). Credit constraints are
successful for producing amplification in the response of the economy to typical
negative shocks. In this thesis, however, business cycles can also be driven by
changes in investor sentiment and amplification is at work in expansions as well as
in recessions.
In the international finance literature, shifts in investor sentiment have usually
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been analyzed within the context of currency crises, often using sunspot models
that produce multiple equilibria. In this thesis, we take a different approach by
considering a model with a unique equilibrium that can endogenously produce shifts
in investors’ confidence and switches between good states and bad ones which allows
us to predict when these shifts occur and how long it takes for the market to recover
after a bust.
This thesis is also related to the literature on learning in macro and finance.
Particularly, Wang (1994), models dividends as noisy signals to analyze trading vol-
ume in stock markets, Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2004) use noisy dividend
signals to investigate the effects of investor sophistication on international equity
flows, and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2004) use them to explain U.S. business
cycle asymmetries in an RBC framework with asymmetric learning.
In order to analyze whether the homogeneity of information plays a critical role
in the model, we also present a scenario in which investors are differentially informed.
This exercise is motivated by the findings of Calvo and Mendoza (2000). In this
“asymmetric information” setup, we assume that foreign investors are less informed
than domestic investors.3 Unlike their foreign counterparts, domestic investors are
assumed to know the true state of productivity: in other words, domestic investors
are perfectly informed. We conclude that it is sufficient to assume that one set of
3Empirical evidence about informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors
is mixed. Using data from Korea, Germany, Indonesia and China, Choe et al. (2000), Hau (2001),
Dvorak (2001), Chan et al. (2003), and Chakravarty et al. (1998) find that domestic investors have
more valuable information than their foreign counterparts. On the other hand, Seasholes (2000),
Grinblatt and Kelahaiju (2000), Wang and Stulz (1997) and Chui and Kwok (1998) use data for
Taiwan, Finland, Japan and China and find that foreigners have more valuable information since
they have the expertise that the domestic investors lack.
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investors is imperfectly informed for the model to produce “misperception driven
cycles,” although the magnitude of these booms and busts would depend on the
proportion of imperfectly informed investors. (See Section 4 for details of this setup.)
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. We describe the model in Chapter
2, and in Chapter 3 we discuss the model’s solution procedure, calibration, and
numerical results. Chapter 4 goes on to investigate the implications of introducing




The economy has two classes of agents, foreign investors and domestic household-
investors, who are identical within each class. The domestic households maximize
expected lifetime utility by making consumption and asset holding decisions condi-
tional on their information set, that includes the noisy signals about the true state
of productivity. Foreign investors choose their asset positions in order to maximize
the expected present discounted value of profits based on their beliefs about the
state of productivity. Foreign investors also face trading costs associated with op-
erating in the asset market. Neither domestic nor foreign investors observe the true
realization of the stochastic productivity shock, which contains information relevant
for forecasting the returns from the asset. They only observe dividends, which are
noisy signals about the true value of productivity. Foreign and domestic investors
form their beliefs by solving a signal extraction problem.
2.1 Domestic Households’ Problem
Domestic households choose stochastic intertemporal plans for consumption,
ct, and asset holdings, αt+1, in order to maximize expected life-time utility condi-
10












ct + αt+1qt = αt(qt + dt) (2.2)
taking asset prices, qt, and the evolution of beliefs and their information set I
U as
given.1 dt denotes dividend payments of the emerging market asset, the parameter σ
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of domestic investors and β is the standard
subjective discount factor.
At the beginning of each period, productivity shocks are realized and dividends
are determined. Domestic investors make their decisions after observing dividends.
The optimality conditions characterizing their decisions are:
βtu′(ct)− λt = 0 (2.3)
−λtqt + Et[λt+1(dt+1 + qt+1)|IUt ] = 0 (2.4)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.








1We discuss the role of the expectation operator and the information structure in Section 2.3.
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This equation is familiar except that the expectations are taken conditional on the
information set IUt .
2.2 Foreign Investors’ Problem
As in Mendoza and Smith (2004), foreign investors choose {α∗t+1}∞0 in order







α∗t (dt + qt)− α∗t+1qt − qt
a
2
(α∗t+1 − α∗t + θ)2|IU0
)
(2.6)




(α∗t+1 − α∗t + θ)2 is the total trading cost associated with buying and
selling equities in the emerging economies, θ is the recurrent cost. As in Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and Smith (2004), we model the trading cost associated
with buying and selling the asset as quadratic in the size of the asset trade.2 The
first order condition of the foreign investors’ problem is:
qt
(




dt+1 + qt+1(1 + a(α
∗
t+2 − α∗t+1 + θ))|IUt
]
. (2.7)
2This specification does not rule out buy & hold type of trading strategies. The foreign investors
are allowed to buy and “watch” the market and sell when they find it profitable to so. The
assumption that θ 6= 0 implies that “watching” the market also comes at a cost although it is less
costly compared to trading. It is intuitive to assume that “watching” the market is costly as the
investors still need to follow the developments in the emerging economy so as to determine the
right time to sell. In Section 3.4, we do analyze the robustness of out results to this assumption
by solving the case in which θ = 0.
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We can solve the above first order condition forward to obtain:









qbt , called the belief price, is defined as the expected present discounted value of
future dividends conditional on the current belief about productivity:
qbt ≡ E[R−1dt+1 + R−2dt+2 + R−3dt+3 + . . . |IUt ]. (2.9)
Intuitively, foreign investors adjust their asset holdings “partially” depending on the
gap between the market price qt and their belief price q
b
t . How much of this gap is
reflected in the asset demand is determined by 1/a.
2.3 Information Structure
Dividends are determined exogenously as follows:
dt = e
zt+ηt . (2.10)
There are two types of uncertainty associated with dividends: persistent aggregate
productivity shocks, z, and noise, in the form of transitory, additive, Normal i.i.d.
shocks, η, with E[η] = −σ2η/2 and E[η2] = σ2η: η ∼ N(−σ2η/2, σ2η).3 Aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks follow a Markov process with two states and transition probability
matrix P . We denote the values z can take as z ∈ {zL, zH} and assume zL < zH
3This specification for E[η] guarantees that changes in ση produce mean preserving spreads.
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without loss of generality.
Assumption P >> 0 (irreducible Markov chain) and Pii 6= Pji where Pij is the
probability of transiting from state i to state j, i, j ∈ {L,H} and i 6= j (positive
autocorrelation).
P >> 0 rules out absorbent states. Pii = Pji would imply that the probability
of transiting to state i is the same regardless of the current state. Therefore, in this
case, information regarding the current state would not be useful for forecasting the
following period’s state (no autocorrelation).
We assume both sets of investors know the true distributions governing the
productivity shocks z and the noise η. They observe the dividends d at the beginning
of each period, but do not observe the current or past values of the productivity
shock z or the noise η.4 Both investors use the information revealed by dividends
in order to infer the realization of the productivity shock in the current period.5
Beliefs are defined as:
z̃t ≡ E[zt|IUt ] (2.11)
where IUt includes the entire history of dividends observed by the investors:
IUt ≡ {dt, dt−1, . . .}. (2.12)
4One can imagine that investors observe productivity with such a long lag that, once received,
the information is no longer useful for predicting current productivity any more.
5It is also possible to model different types of publicly observed signals, such as news reports,
in addition to dividends. In any case, the model variables will be sensitive to the information
content of the signals and this sensitivity will be qualitatively similar but quantitatively different
depending on the informativeness of the publicly observed signals.
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Throughout the thesis we refer to this information structure as the “incomplete
information” scenario. The belief z̃t is formed by updating the previous period’s
belief z̃t−1 using Bayes’ rule, as in Hamilton (1989), Moore and Schaller (2002), and
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2003):
Pr(zt = z
i|IUt ) =
f(dt|zt = zi)Pr(zt = zi|IUt−1)
f(dt|zt = zj)Pr(zt = zj|IUt−1) + f(dt|zt = zi)Pr(zt = zi|IUt−1)
(2.13)
where f is the conditional normal probability density that can be written as:







for i, j ∈ {H, L} and i 6= j. Equation (2.13) is used to update the probability
assigned to being in the high productivity state, incorporating the additional infor-
mation revealed by dt at the beginning of period t. The priors that will be used in
period t+1 for updating beliefs are obtained by simply adjusting for the probability
of a change in state from period t to t+1 using the Markov transition matrix known
by investors. That is:
Pr(zt+1 = z
i|IUt ) = Pr(zt = zi|IUt )Pii + Pr(zt = zj|IUt )Pji. (2.15)
Once the posteriors of the current period are calculated, beliefs are:
z̃t = Pr(zt = z
L|IUt )zL + Pr(zt = zH |IUt )zH . (2.16)
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Proposition 1 0 < Pr(zt = z
i|IUt−1) < 1 and 0 < Pr(zt = zi|IUt ) < 1.
Proof See Appendix.
The interval to be considered for the prior and posterior probabilities is (0, 1).
The prior Pr(z0 = z
i|IU−1) or the posterior Pr(z0 = zi|IU0 ) can be set exogenously
to “start” from 0 or 1. Afterwards, however, it can take these values with zero
probability. From Equation (2.16), we know that beliefs are convex combinations of
low and high values of productivity, with weights defined by the Bayesian posterior
probabilities assigned to each state. Hence, beliefs are always higher than the low
value of productivity and lower than the high value, zL < z̃ < zH . This implies
that agents can never be exactly sure about being in a particular state. In addition,
they never underestimate (overestimate) productivity to be lower (higher) than the
low (high) realization of the true productivity. This is an unappealing feature of
learning with discrete probabilistic processes. Also, as a result of this limitation,
the standard deviation of beliefs is always less than or equal to that of productivity.
Equation (2.16) implies that beliefs are sufficient to backtrack the probabil-
ities assigned to each state. Using Equation (2.16) and Pr(zt = z
i|IUt ) = 1 −
Pr(zt = z
j|IUt ) for i, j ∈ {H, L} and i 6= j, a given z̃t can be mapped to a unique
Pr(zt = z
i|IUt ). The assumption that provides this simplification is having two
states for productivity. This simplification is crucial for the numerical analysis since
probabilities assigned to each state are continuous endogenous state variables for the
problem. Given the computational difficulty of handling continuous state variables,
we assume two states for productivity and carry z̃ as a state variable that is sufficient
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for backtracking the posterior probabilities assigned to each state of productivity.
Figure 2.1: Density of dt conditional on zt.








We denote the evolution of investors’ beliefs as z̃t+1 = φ(z̃t, dt+1). When in-
vestors make their decisions at date t, dt+1 is not known, but its distribution condi-
tional on zt+1 is known to both domestic and foreign investors. Figure 2.1 plots these
conditional distributions for signal-to-noise ratios of 1.66 and 2.26, respectively.6 As
the signal-to-noise ratio increases, the distribution of dividends conditional on the
high and low productivity overlap less, as a result, dividends become more infor-
mative. In Figure 2.1, most of the conditional density is concentrated around the
means when the signal-to-noise ratio is high (right panel). As ση decreases (or as
the signal-to-noise ratio increases), these two conditional densities separate, and in
the limit as ση approaches zero, the informational imperfection vanishes.
In Figure 2.2, we plot z̃t+1 = φ(z̃t, dt+1) for three different values of z̃t where
dt+1 is on the horizontal axis and z̃t+1 is on the vertical axis. The solid curve
6The signal-to-noise ratio is defined as z
H−zL
ση
. We pick these particular values for the signal-
to-noise ratios because they are also the ones used for the numerical analysis.
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corresponds to z̃t+1 = φ(min(z̃), dt+1); that is, it is the case where the investors are
“almost sure” that the economy is in the bad state today. Similarly, the dashed
curve shows z̃t+1 = φ(max(z̃), dt+1), or the case in which they are optimistic. All
other beliefs would be represented by curves that lie between the solid and dashed
curves, such as the dotted curve, which shows the case in which the investors assign




Figure 2.2: Next period’s beliefs z̃t+1 = φ(z̃t, dt+1) for three different values of
current beliefs z̃t.















Proposition 2 If Pii < Pji then φ(z̃t, dt+1) is strictly increasing in both of its ar-
guments.
Proof See Appendix.
Pii > Pji corresponds to a scenario where knowing the current state would
still be useful for forecasting future productivity: the information that the economy
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is in a particular state would reveal that the economy is more likely to transition
to the other state than to stay in the same state in the subsequent period (negative
autocorrelation). Although information is valuable and learning would still take
place, we rule out the case Pii > Pji in order to establish Proposition 2.
The elasticity of z̃t+1 with respect to dt+1 varies depending on z̃t. When
the investors assign a high probability to being in the low state (z̃t is low), a low
realization of dt+1 “confirms” the beliefs and as a result z̃t+1 changes only marginally.
On the other hand, if a high dt+1 is observed, the beliefs of investors are “challenged”
and there is a large adjustment in the next period’s beliefs.
In order to see this, consider the following scenario. Assume that true produc-
tivity is low and that investors’ current beliefs are “almost correct”. In this case,
z̃t = min z̃, as depicted by “lowest beliefs” curve in Figure 2.2. The vertical line
in Figure 2.2 marks the mean of the signals conditional on the economy being in
the low state. Hence, a small negative noise shock is a realization of dividends to
the left of this vertical line. If investors observe a negative noisy signal at t + 1,
the response of beliefs to this signal is minimal (the solid curve is flat on the left
side of the vertical line). On the other hand, if investors receive a sequence of mis-
leading positive signals before the negative one, their optimism builds up and their
beliefs can move to reach that reflected in dashed curve in Figure 2.2. When the
economy ends up in this situation, the response to a small negative signal is large
(the dashed curve is steep on the left side of the vertical line). Therefore, a stream
of positive signals can move the economy to a vulnerable state in which a negative
signal triggers a large downward adjustment. As investors turn optimistic, it is as if
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the economy is moving along the convex part of this curve. The point of maximum
vulnerability lies at the intersection of the vertical line and the inflection point of
the curve.
Figure 2.3 shows the numerical derivative of φ(z̃t, dt+1) with respect to dt+1
around dt+1 = z
L as a function of z̃t.
7 This derivative captures the response of
the beliefs to a small, negative signal conditional on true productivity being low,
and it approximates the “vulnerability” of the economy. Figure 2.3 illustrates that
this derivative is a convex function. Hence, the response of beliefs to a negative
signal increases at an increasing rate with the level of optimism attained prior to
the negative signal. The convexity of the derivative of φ(.) is due to the assumption
that true productivity is a discrete random variable. In the case of continuous
random variables, learning takes place in a linear fashion, that is, the posteriors are
a convex combination of the priors and the signal with weights that depend on the
signal-to-noise ratio. In that case, this derivative would be linearly increasing in the
level of optimism prior to the negative signal.
The quantitative analysis focuses on the model’s equilibrium which is defined
as follows.
Definition A competitive equilibrium is given by allocations α′(α, z̃, d), c(α, z̃, d),
α∗′(α, z̃, d) and asset prices q(α, z̃, d) such that:
(i) Domestic households maximize U subject to their budget constraint and their
information set, IU , taking asset prices as given.
7We approximate this derivative numerically with φ(z̃,z
L)−φ(z̃,zL−ε)
ε for ε small and positive. In
the figure, we plot this expression for different values of z̃.
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Figure 2.3: The derivative of φ(z̃t, dt+1) with respect to dt+1 as a function of z̃t.








(ii) Foreign investors maximize the expected present discounted value of future
profits conditional on their beliefs about the state of productivity, taking asset
prices as given.





The dynamic programming representation of the domestic investors’ problem
for i, j ∈ {L,H} and i 6= j is:
V (α,z̃, d) = max
α′
{u(α(q + d)− α′q)
+ β
[
Pr(z = zi|IU)Pii + Pr(z = zj|IU)Pji
] ∫
V (α′, φ(z̃, d′), d′)f(d′|z′ = zi)dd′
+ β
[
Pr(z = zi|IU)Pij + Pr(z = zj|IU)Pjj
] ∫
V (α′, φ(z̃, d′), d′)f(d′|z′ = zj)dd′}.
(3.1)
The solution algorithm includes the following steps:
1. Discretize the state space. We use 102 equally spaced nodes for α and 40 equally
spaced nodes for z̃ in the intervals [.83, 1.00] and [zL, zH ] respectively. To discretize
the noise component of dividends we use Gaussian quadratures with 20 quadrature
nodes.
2. Evaluate the evolution of beliefs z̃t+1 = φ(z̃t, dt+1) using Equations (2.13)-(2.16).
3. For a conjectured pricing function qold(α, z̃, d), solve the dynamic programming
problem described in Equation 3.1 using value function iterations in order to get
α′(α, z̃, d) and c(α, z̃, d).
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4. Calculate the foreign investors’ demand function using domestic investors’ asset
demand function obtained in Step 3 and the market clearing condition in the asset
market, α∗ + α = 1.
5. Using foreign investors’ demand calculated in Equation (2.8), calculate new prices
qnew(α, z̃, d).
6. Update the conjectured prices with ξqold(α, z̃, d) + (1− ξ)qnew(α, z̃, d) where ξ is
a fixed relaxation parameter that satisfies ξ ∈ (0, 1) and is set close to 1 in order to
dampen hog cycles.
7. Iterate prices until convergence according to the stopping criterion max{|qnew −
qold|} < 0.00001 and get equilibrium asset prices q(α, z̃, d).
To check the accuracy of the solution of the dynamic programming problem,
we evaluate Euler equation residuals as described in Judd (1992). In order to do so,
we solve for ĉ in the following Euler equation:
qtu
′(ĉt) = βEt[(qt+1 + dt+1)u′(ct+1)]. (3.2)
Intuitively, we evaluate the consumption function that exactly satisfies the Euler
equation implied by the solution of the dynamic programming problem. Then, we
calculate 1− (ĉt/ct), which is a unitless measure of error. We find that the average
Euler equation error is 0.0016.1
Euler equation errors do not include the errors from the price iteration since
the Euler equation must hold for any pricing function, not only the equilibrium
1Judd (1992) calls this measure the “bounded rationality measure,” and interprets an error of
0.0016 as a $16 error made on a $10000 expenditure.
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pricing function. As a measure for the accuracy of the equilibrium price, we report
the tolerance of the price iteration. Tolerance is defined as the maximum of the
absolute value of the difference between prices evaluated in the last two consecutive
iterations, max{|qnew − qold|}. We iterate prices until tolerance is less than 0.00001.
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated quarterly for Turkey using data for the 1987:1-2005:2
period. We set the risk free interest rate to average US Treasury Bill rate, R =
(1.0471).25 = 1.0115. We set β = 0.9886 and σ = 2 following the business cycles
literature. We set the trading costs of the foreign investors to {a = 0.001, θ = 0.1}.
With this calibration, total trading costs on average constitute 0.2589% of foreign
investors’ per period profits as specified in Equation (2.6) and 1.8845% of the trade
value. These costs are in line with the findings of Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan
(2001) showing equity trading costs during the period 1996-1998 for a total of 42
countries among which 20 are emerging countries. They found that for emerging
markets, trading costs are higher than the developed ones and they range between
0.58% (Brazil) and 1.97% (Korea) as percentage of trade value.
We estimate the parameters {ση, zH , zL} and Markov transition probabilities
{PHH , PLL} using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure similar to the one
described in Hamilton (1989). For this exercise, we use quarterly GDP data for
Turkey from 1987:1 to 2005:2 with a total of 74 observations. The data are from
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s web site and are in constant 1987 prices.
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They are logged, seasonally adjusted (using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s X12
Method) and filtered with HP filter using a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 3.1: Model parameters
β 0.9881 Discount factor
R 1.0121 Risk free rate
σ 2 Risk aversion coefficient
PHH 0.8933 Transition probability from H to H
PLL 0.6815 Transition probability from L to L
zL -0.0427 Productivity in state L
zH +0.0175 Productivity in state H




{a, θ} {0.001, 0.1} Trading costs
We denote the observed GDP series as yt for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} and the pa-
rameters to be estimated are ψ ≡ {zi, zj, ση, Pii, Pjj}. The algorithm used for the
estimation is as follows:
1. Calculate the ergodic distribution of the Markov process, π = [πi πj], using
πi = (1− Pjj)/(2− Pjj − Pii). πj can be calculated using πi + πj = 1.
2. Calculate the conditional density:












where Pr(zt = z
i|yt−1) denotes the posterior probability assigned to being in state
i conditional on the observed history of y until period t− 1.
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3. For t = 1, when no history is available, use the ergodic probabilities calcu-
lated in Step 1 instead of the conditional probabilities.
4. Update the prior probability Pr(zt = z
i|yt−1) using Bayesian updating
Equations 2.13 and 2.15.
5. Repeat Steps 2-4 for ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}.
6. The log likelihood function is evaluated by simply adding the logged con-




ln f(yt; ψ|yt−1). (3.4)
7. Maximize the log likelihood function:
max
ψ
L(ψ; yT ) (3.5)
subject to Pii > 0, Pjj > 0 and Pii > Pji (see Assumption).
The estimates of the productivity shock are {zH , zL} = {0.0175,−0.0427}
which translate into {exp(zH), exp(zL)} = {1 + 0.0177, 1− 0.0418}. The estimated
transition probabilities are PHH = 0.8933 and PLL = 0.6815. The estimated per-
sistent component variance is σz = 0.0260, and the estimated noise component
variance is ση is 0.0362, the ratio of the two is
σz
ση
= 0.7182. With these pa-
rameters, the estimated signal-to-noise ratio is z
H−zL
ση
= 1.6638. The productivity
shocks and the transition probability matrix approximate a Normal AR(1) process:




= 0.5888 which constitutes another measure of information content of the sig-
nals.2
3.3 Quantitative Findings
Figure 3.1 shows the ergodic distribution of the domestic investors’ asset po-
sition, α, for a situation in which investors have full information (panel (a)) and
in which investors have incomplete information (panel (b)) scenarios. The “full in-
formation” scenario corresponds to the case in which the information set of both
investors is IIt ≡ {dt, dt−1, . . . , zt, zt−1, . . .}.3 In both cases, the ergodic distributions
are skewed to the left. The informational imperfection reduces the mean asset hold-
ings of domestic investors. This is because the informational imperfection increases
the uncertainty associated with future asset returns, and, hence, risk averse domestic
investors are less inclined to demand risky assets.
The ergodic distribution of beliefs, z̃, is plotted in Figure 3.2. In this distribu-
tion, most of the mass is concentrated at the tails, or around zL and zH . This result
arises because beliefs usually being close to correct. The extent to which the mass
is concentrated at the tails depends crucially on the signal-to-noise ratio. The more
informative the signals, the less beliefs deviate from the truth and the more the
ergodic distribution is concentrated at the tails. Another feature of this distribution
2This, in fact, is the conventional measure of the information content of the signals when
learning takes place about continuous as opposed to discrete variables.
3One can model a full information scenario by setting ση = 0. However, doing so would alter the
distribution of the dividend process. As a result, it would not be possible to distinguish changes
in results that are due to full information per se from those due to the change in the distribution
of the dividend process.
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Figure 3.1: Ergodic distribution of domestic investors’ asset holdings, α, in the case
of (a) full information, and (b) incomplete information.





Figure 3.2: Ergodic distribution of beliefs, z̃.
0.97 0.98 0.99 1 1.01zL zH 
Beliefs 
is its skewness. Skewness is a result of the asymmetry of the Markov transition
matrix. The high state is more persistent than the low, an asymmetry that both
sets of investors acknowledge as they formulate their beliefs. Knowing that there
are more periods in which the economy is in the high state than in the low state,
investors’ beliefs are more likely to be close to zH than zL.
Table 3.2 documents the long run moments of simulated and actual data.4
Consistent with Figure 3.1, average asset holdings of the domestic investors is higher
4We simulate the model for 10,000 periods and calculate the moments after dropping the first
1,000 observations.
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Table 3.2: Long-run business cycle moments, simulated data is logged and HP
filtered.






σ(z) 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884
σ(η) 3.6341 3.6341 3.6341
σ(d) 4.5694 4.5514 4.5514
σ(c)/E(c) (%) 5.4597 2.1265 4.2168
σ(q)/E(q) (%) 38.0997 0.0370 0.0283
σ(CA/d) (%) 3.1168 3.6134 3.8935
corr(d, c) 0.6984 0.3153 0.4425
corr(d, q) 0.0718 0.5611 0.8327
corr(d, CA) -0.4217 0.9019 0.5801
corr(d, α′) 0.0347 0.1655
corr(z̃, z̃−1) x 0.5532
corr(z, q) 0.9990 0.6678
in the full information scenario than in the incomplete information scenario (86.1
percent v. 84 percent). As a result of their greater asset holdings, domestic investors’
consumption is also higher on average in the full information scenario than in the
incomplete information. In the full information case, higher average consumption
and lower consumption volatility lead to a higher level of welfare compared to the
case in which investors have only incomplete information.
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Going from the full information setup to one with incomplete information,
the standard deviations of consumption and the current account increase by 2.1
percentage points, and 0.4 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the standard
deviation of asset prices falls by 0.87 basis points. The decline in the standard
deviation of asset prices is due to beliefs being a convex combination of the low and
high value of true productivity. (See Equation (2.16) and Proposition 1.)
The correlation between true productivity, z, and asset prices, q, falls from
0.9990 in the full information setup to 0.6678 in the incomplete information setup.
This is due to booms-busts induced by the imperfection of information, which gives
rise to misperceptions regarding the true state of productivity. In the full infor-
mation case, all of the cycles are driven by changes in true productivity and noise
shocks have negligible effects on asset prices. Although most of the booms and busts
in the incomplete information scenario are also due to changes in true productivity,
there is a significant number of optimism-pessimism driven cycles.
The autocorrelation coefficient of z̃ is 0.5532 which suggests that transitory
shocks have persistent effects on beliefs. This occurs because investors cannot dis-
tinguish the component of shocks that is persistent from the component that is
transitory. The belief updating structure is the key element in the model that in-
duces persistence: the previous period’s posteriors are current period’s priors.
Another important observation from Table 3.2 is the decrease in the correlation
between dividends and the current account going from full information to imperfect
information (0.90 vs. 0.58). In response to a positive dividend shock, domestic
investors would like to increase their asset position so as to smooth consumption
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over time and in addition, their expectations for asset returns increase since they
observe a positive signal. Foreign investors are modeled not to have a consumption
smoothing motive therefore, for them only the second effect (positive signal) is
present and this effect is in fact stronger than their domestic counterparts because
they bid more aggressively for the asset when there is a positive signal due to their
risk neutrality. Overall, we find that usually the first effect is greater than the
second, and therefore, the model produces a procyclical current account. However,
as we mentioned the procyclicality is lower compared to the full information scenario
where only the first effect is present.





















Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show simulated asset prices, productivity, and consumption
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under full information and incomplete information, respectively. In the full infor-
mation case, swings in asset prices match the swings in productivity and shocks
to the transitory component of dividends have minimal effects on prices. Without
the information role of dividends, in response to a negative noise shock domestic
investors would like to be net sellers so as to intertemporally smooth their con-
sumption and thus at equilibrium asset prices fall. However, this effect on prices
is small and not visible in the figure. In the incomplete information scenario, as-
set prices fluctuate both with true productivity and with transitory shocks. Noisy
signals thus can induce cycles driven by misperceptions among investors regarding
true productivity. In addition, as mentioned before, the volatility of consumption
increases substantially when we introduce informational imperfections.
In Figure 3.5, we plot the conditional forecasting functions starting from a
state where investors are optimistic (first column) and where they are pessimistic
(second column). In the optimistic scenario we set the state variables to (α, z̃, d) =
(0.840, 0.017, 0.958): that is, beliefs are z̃ = max(z̃); dividends are set to signal
that the productivity is low; d = ez
L
and the domestic investors’ asset position
is set to its long-run mean. The pessimistic scenario is set to start at (α, z̃, d) =
(0.840,−0.042, 0.958). Hence, these scenarios are identical except for the initial
beliefs.
In the figures for consumption and asset prices, the vertical axes show per-
centage deviations from long-run means. In the figure for the current account, the
vertical axis shows the ratio of the current account to dividends in percentage terms.
On impact in period one, the economy with optimistic investors is characterized by a
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Figure 3.5: Forecasting functions conditional on α = 0.840, d = zL, z̃ = zH (first
column), and z̃ = zL (second column).
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current account deficit as well as a boom in consumption and asset prices. In period
two, however, consumption falls sharply below its mean by 1.5% and the current
account turns to a surplus of roughly 2.5%. The prices also adjust downwards but
the adjustment is more gradual than those of consumption and the current account.
After the second period, all variables slowly and monotonically converge to their
long-run means.
The dynamics of the model economy starting with optimistic investors are
similar to that of an emerging market in the period before a crisis. As documented in
Chapter 1, pre-crisis periods are generally characterized by current account deficits
as well as consumption and asset price booms. Our model is able to forecast a
collapse in consumption and asset prices as well as reversal of the current account
after this period of optimism.
The results in Table 3.2 suggested that the model produces a procyclical cur-
rent account on average and in the imperfect information scenario this procyclicality
is lower than in the full information case. Previously, we explained the model dynam-
ics that lead to this result. The forecasting functions plotted in Figure 3.5 support
the previous explanation and the results of Table 3.2. Particulary, the economy
with optimistic investors has a current account deficit because, ceteris paribus, the
higher the beliefs, the lower the current account.
Table 3.3 analyzes optimism and pessimism driven cycles in terms of their
frequency, average duration, and magnitude. In order to conduct the analysis, we
use simulated data to identify periods in which investors assign a probability greater
than 0.5 to productivity being high (low) even though the true productivity is low
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Table 3.3: Analysis of optimism (pessimism) driven booms (busts).
Probability (%) Booms Busts
Prob[Prob(zt = z
i|IUt , zt = zj) > 0.5] 9.6800 4.2300
Prob[Prob(zt = z
i|IUt , zt = zj) > 0.5|zt = zj] 37.1023 5.7232
Duration (quarters)









(high) and call them optimism (pessimism) periods.5 In the second and third rows
of Table 3.3, we report the ratio of the number of optimism (pessimism) periods
to the total number of observations, and to the number of periods in which the
state was low (high), respectively. We calculate the average duration by calculating
the average length of the distinct optimism-pessimism periods. Given the inherent
noisiness of signals obtained by calibrating the model to a typical emerging economy,
this table reveals how often investors turn optimistic-pessimistic due to misleading
signals, how long these periods last, and more importantly, whether and how much
5Note that by doing so, we are picking up only those periods in which optimism and pessimism
are due to misperceptions of investors.
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optimism (pessimism) periods are associated with booms (busts) in asset prices and
consumption and current account deficits (surpluses).
Unconditionally, the model produces optimism driven booms with a 9.64%
probability, whereas it produces pessimism driven busts with a 4.23% probability.
Also, given that the true state is low, there is a 37.10% probability that the investors
are optimistic and similarly, conditional on the true productivity being high, the
investors are pessimistic with 5.72% probability. The former is more likely to happen
because investors interpret positive signals to be more “credible” than negative
signals due to the asymmetry of the Markov transition probability matrix. The
optimism in response to a misleading positive signal is greater than the pessimism
caused by a misleading negative signal with the same magnitude.
On average, the model predicts an average duration of 1.35 (1.21) quarters
for the optimism (pessimism) driven booms (busts). These cycles are relatively
short lived because these cycles hinge on the realization of a sequence of positive or
negative signals.
In the same table, we also report the size of these booms-busts as percentage
deviations from the value that corresponding variables would have taken if investors
had correctly estimated the true productivity instead of being optimistic or pes-
simistic. The magnitude for the asset price boom is small when we look at it as
percentage deviation because the equilibrium asset prices have low volatility. This
magnitude is closer to what we observe in the data in terms of standard deviations.
The boom periods are characterized by asset prices, consumption, and current ac-
count that are on average 2.36, 1.31, and 0.83 standard deviations above what they
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would have been if the investors were not optimistic. The over-pricing as well as
over-consumption are evident in this table. Especially, the over-pricing of the emerg-
ing market asset is significant: during the booms on average we observe prices that
are more than two standard deviations higher that what they would have been if in-
vestors were not optimistic. Similarly, we see under-pricing and under-consumption
during the busts, although their magnitudes are smaller in absolute value than those
observed during booms due to the asymmetry of the Markov process.
3.4 From Miracles to Crises
In Figure 3.6 we plot the response of asset prices to a sequence of positive
signals, particularly to one, two, three and four consecutive one standard deviation
positive transitory shocks, respectively. In each of these scenarios, we set the true
state to low (z = zL) and with the one standard deviation transitory shocks, the
signals can be written as d = zL + ση. After the positive signals a truth revealing
signal (d = zL) arrives. Figure 3.6 plots the response of asset prices as percentage
deviations from its long run mean conditional on z = zL.
In line with the analysis of Chapter 2, Figure 3.6 establishes the relation
between the size of the booms and the magnitude of the downward adjustment due
to the truth revealing signal that arrives after the peak of the boom. Although
the signal that is observed after the positive signals is exactly the same in all of
these scenarios, asset prices respond differently because of learning dynamics, beliefs
respond more to challenging signals compared to the confirming ones.
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Figure 3.6: Sequences of positive signals
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3.5 Turkey vs. U.S.
In order to establish the difference of a developed economy from a typical
emerging market economy, we estimate the model’s parameters governing the in-
formativeness of the signals using GDP data for the U.S. for the same time period
using the same estimation procedure.6 Not surprisingly, the total variance of the
U.S. GDP is significantly higher than that of Turkey (1.0121 vs. 4.5694).7 Table
3.4 reports the results of the estimation for the U.S. and also reproduces those for
Turkey. Comparing σ(z) and σ(η) for these two countries reveals that the variance
for the persistent component as well as the noise is lower for the U.S. In the model
at hand, the informativeness of signals is determined by the ratio of these two vari-




= 2.7053 (vs. 1.6638 for Turkey) suggesting a more trivial learning for
the case of the U.S.
To see the differences of these two economies visually, we plot time series
simulations of the persistent and transitory shocks for the U.S. and Turkey in Figure
3.7, ensuring that the plots are in the same scale. In addition to the observations
made before, one can also see in this figure that for the case of Turkey, switches
between the low and high states of the persistent component are more frequent. This
is also consistent with the common argument that emerging market economies face
6U.S. data are from OECD’s web site, and are in constant prices, seasonally adjusted and HP
filtered with a smoothing parameter 1600.
7This volatility for the U.S. GDP is somewhat lower than the ones calculated by other studies
in the literature because we only consider the 1987:1-2005:2 period which is characterized by a
lower volatility compared the period before the 1980’s. We restrict our analysis to this time frame
since quarterly Turkish data is available starting 1987.
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Table 3.4: U.S. vs Turkey, parameters
Turkey U.S.
PHH 0.8933 0.9117 Transition probability from H to H
PLL 0.6815 0.9317 Transition probability from L to L
zL -0.0427 -0.0054 Productivity in state L
zH 0.0175 0.0108 Productivity in state H
ση 0.0362 0.0060 Standard deviation of noise
zH−zL
ση
1.6638 2.7053 Signal-to-noise ratio
σ(z) 2.5884 0.8109 Variance of the persistent component
σ(η) 3.6341 0.6124 Variance of the transitory component
σ(d) 4.5694 1.0121 Total variance
more frequent and dramatic changes in their fiscal and monetary policies potentially
due to higher political instability. Motivated by this striking difference in the signal-
to-noise ratios of these economies, we solve our model with the U.S. calibration,
analyze its implications and report the results in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 documents the magnitude, frequency and the duration of booms and
busts due to misperceptions of investors for the cases of U.S. and Turkey. Definitions
of optimism and pessimism and all of the calculations are the same as those of Table
3.3. The first two rows of the table reveal that the unconditional and conditional
probabilities of both booms and busts are lower for the case of U.S. compared to
Turkey. This is mainly driven by the higher signal-to-noise ratio estimated for the
U.S. leading to more informative signals and making it less likely for the investors
to be misled. Another observation is the reversed asymmetry, for Turkey optimism
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Table 3.5: U.S. vs Turkey, booms and busts
Turkey U.S.
Probability (%) Booms/Busts Booms/Busts
Prob[Prob(zt = z
i|IUt , zt = zj) > 0.5] 9.6800/4.2300 1.7836/2.4004
Prob[Prob(zt = z
i|IUt , zt = zj) > 0.5|zt = zj] 37.1023/5.7232 3.1388/4.5598
Duration (quarters)









driven booms occur with a higher probability than busts whereas pessimism driven
busts are more likely for the U.S. A careful observation of Table 3.4 reveals that the
low state is slightly more persistent than the high state (comparing PLL with PHH)
for the U.S. which is in contrast with the case of Turkey. This difference in the
Markov transition matrices estimated for these countries accounts for the reversed
asymmetry.
In terms of the durations, the cycles generated by the model calibrated Turkey
are on average longer than those generated by the model calibrated to the U.S.
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Noisier signals for the case of Turkey make it more likely for the investors to receive
consecutive misleading signals and extend the time it takes for them to correct their
beliefs leading to longer misperceptions driven booms and busts.
The magnitude of consumption booms/busts are significantly larger for Turkey
than the U.S. but this result does not hold for asset prices. The higher signal-to-
noise ratio for the U.S. leads to a higher asset price volatility.8 In units of the
standard deviations of the corresponding variables reported in the last three rows,
all of the magnitudes are larger for the case of Turkey.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
We document the long run business cycle moments of the model with different
calibrations for the noisiness of the signals, ση, and trading costs, a and θ. The third
column of Table 3.6 shows the results with ση = 0.0265 and we compare these results
with those of the baseline model with ση = 0.0362 reproduced in the second column.
9
With lower ση, the standard deviation of dividends, consumption and the current
account fall by 85, 20, and 27 basis points, respectively. Average consumption
among domestic investors increases due to the lower volatility of dividends and the
associated decrease in uncertainty regarding future asset returns.
Lower ση implies that the signals are more informative and credible. Therefore,
learning is faster compared to the baseline scenario. This leads to less persistence in
beliefs. The autocorrelation of beliefs drops down to 0.54 from 0.55 in the baseline
8Remember that the full information model produces more volatile asset prices than the incom-
plete information as documented in Table 3.2.
9With ση = 0.0265 the signal-to-noise ratio increases to 2.26 from 1.66 in the baseline scenario.
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity analysis, simulated data is logged and linearly detrended.
Incomplete Information Baseline ση = 0.0265 a = 0.002 θ = 0
E(d) 1.0036 1.0036 1.0036 1.0036
E(c) 0.8419 0.8472 0.8663 0.8417
E(q) 83.0617 83.0937 82.9521 83.0636
E(α) 0.8397 0.8448 0.8637 0.8398
E(CA) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
σ(z) 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884
σ(η) 3.6341 2.6512 3.6341 3.6341
σ(d) 4.5514 3.6997 4.5514 4.5514
σ(c)/E(c) (%) 4.2168 4.0287 4.4765 4.2153
σ(q)/E(q) (%) 0.0283 0.0291 0.0288 0.0285
σ(CA) (%) 3.8935 3.7166 4.5698 3.8472
corr(d, c) 0.4425 0.4318 0.2163 0.4519
corr(d, q) 0.8327 0.8505 0.8038 0.8313
corr(d, α′) 0.1655 0.1403 0.0216 0.2064
corr(d, CA) 0.5801 0.6032 0.6591 0.5751
corr(z̃, z̃−1) 0.5532 0.5407 0.5532 0.5532
corr(z, q) 0.6678 0.7282 0.6694 0.6761
model. In addition, the probability of optimism-pessimism driven cycles falls leading
to a stronger correlation between asset prices and true productivity.
The fourth column of the same table presents the results for the scenario with
higher per trade costs, a = 0.002. The standard deviation of prices, consumption,
and the current account increase by 0.05, 26, and 67 basis points, respectively. Due
to higher per trade costs on the foreign investors’ side, domestic investors hold more
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of the asset in equilibrium, leading to higher mean consumption but more volatile
consumption.
Analysis of the scenario with no recurrent costs, θ = 0, is reported in the fifth
column. The results remain largely unchanged except for the slight drops in the




In this section we modify the baseline incomplete information model by as-
suming that domestic investors observe the true state of productivity but that the
signal extraction problem facing the foreign investors’ remains identical to that in
the previous section. The aim of this exercise is to investigate whether the results
for the incomplete information case hinge on the informational homogeneity of in-
vestors (i.e., on whether the results change when the investors are asymmetrically
informed and they “disagree” on the state of the economy.)
The information set of domestic investors as of time t, IIt , is now defined as:
IIt ≡ {dt, dt−1, . . . , zt, zt−1, . . .}. (4.1)
The foreign investors’ information set is a subset of domestic investors’, IU ⊂ II
for ∀ t.1 Domestic investors maximize the same objective function as before, but
conditional on the information set in Equation (4.1)subject to Equation (2.2) and
taking the evolution of foreign investors’ beliefs, z̃′ = φ(z̃, d′), as given. Even though
they are fully informed, domestic investors keep track of foreign investors’ beliefs,
as they contain information useful for predicting future asset prices.
1Since the information sets of investors can be hierarchically ranked, we do not face an “infinite
regress problem”; i.e., agents do not forecast the forecasts of other agents, avoiding an infinitely
dimensional belief space.
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The objective function and belief updating process of the foreign investors
are the same as in the previous setup. Contrary to conventional models in which
prices reveal information, we abstract from the informational role of prices. This
assumption is implicit in the belief updating equations, where the only signals con-
sidered are the realizations of dividends. One justification for this assumption is
that, as long as prices are not fully revealing, which is likely to be the case even in
developed country asset markets, asset prices will be sensitive to the misperceptions
of uninformed investors. Wang (1994) shows that this is the case using a model
with asymmetric information. In Wang’s model, the equilibrium price has an in-
formational role and is a linear function2 of the return from the private investment
opportunity, the persistent component of dividends (which is what the uninformed
wish to know about), and the uninformed investors’ beliefs. When prices are par-
tially revealing, they act as a device that transmits information from the informed
to the uninformed, lowering the informational gap between the two. In a model in
which prices do not play any informational role, this gap will be larger compared
to an identical model in which prices reveal information. Our strategy to deal with
this problem is to calibrate the model so that dividends are ‘very’ informative and
reveal sufficient information to prevent the informational gap from becoming too
large.
There are two uncertainties faced by domestic households in this setup: the
evolution of the true productivity (which enters the problem directly) and the be-
liefs of foreign investors (which enters indirectly). The latter enters the domestic
2The model is solved analytically assuming CARA utility and Normally distributed returns.
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investors’ problem since the introduction of imperfect information to the foreign
investors’ problem has implications for the domestic investors’ problem as well. The
beliefs of foreign investors affect asset prices and are persistent. They contain infor-
mation for forecasting next period’s prices. Domestic investors treat these beliefs as
a state variable and form expectations about the following period’s beliefs. However,
due to their advantage in separating persistent shocks from noise, on average their
forecasts of future beliefs are more accurate than those of their foreign counterparts’.
Mathematically,
Proposition 3 {E [E[z̃t+1|IIt ]− z̃t+1




With asymmetric information, the total dividend is not a sufficient state vari-
able; z and η enter as separate state variables. The dynamic programming repre-
sentation of the domestic households’ problem is:
V (α, z̃, η, z) = max
α′,c
u(c) + βE[V (α′, z̃′, η, z′|I i)] (4.2)
subject to
c + α′q(α, z̃, η, z) = αq(α, z̃, η, z) + αd (4.3)
and
z̃′ = φ(z̃, d′) (4.4)
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for given prices q(α, z̃, η, z). In order to solve the problem numerically, we substitute
for consumption using the budget constraint, substitute for z̃′ using the evolution
of beliefs, and rewrite the problem as follows for i, j ∈ {H, L} and i 6= j:
V (α, z̃, η, zi) = max
α′
u(αq(α, z̃, η, z) + αd− α′q(α, z̃, η, z))+
βPii
∫
V (α′, φ(z̃, d′), η′, zi)f(d′|zi)dd′+
βPij
∫
V (α′, φ(z̃, d′), η′, zj)f(d′|zj)dd′.
(4.5)
Table 4.1 documents the long run moments of the simulated data. The third
column shows the results for the asymmetric information scenario, whereas the
second column repeats the results of the incomplete information case for comparison.
The most significant difference in the long run moments of these two setups is the
current account volatility and its correlation with dividends. The standard devation
of the current account increases by 7% and its correlation with dividends drops from
0.58 in incomplete information scenario to -0.40 in the asymmetric information case.
This findings suggests that the asymmetric information setup leads to more frequent
trade and higher trading volume because agents trade not only due to differences in
their objective functions but also due to differences in their perceptions of the current
state and in their expectations regarding future returns. Unlike in the incomplete
information setting, domestic investors in the asymmetric information setup can
make capital gains by better predicting the following period’s prices. Indeed, they
have an incentive to “run against the wind” to make capital gains.
Being able distinguish the transitory shocks from the permanent makes asset
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Table 4.1: Simulations for the asymmetric information setup; simulated data are
logged and linearly detrended.









σ(c)/E(c) (%) 4.2168 4.2227
σ(q)/E(q) (%) 0.0283 0.0285
σ(CA/d) (%) 3.8935 11.9711
corr(d, c) 0.4425 0.2505
corr(d, q) 0.8327 0.8322
corr(d, α′) 0.1655 0.0513
corr(d, CA) 0.5801 -0.4018
corr(z̃, z̃−1) 0.5532 0.5532
corr(z, q) 0.6678 0.5681
investment less risky for domestic investors. On average, domestic investors demand
more of the asset. In response to a positive transitory component shock, the domestic
investors would like to buy more of the asset in order to smooth consumption. Their
incentives to increase asset holdings are stronger than under incomplete information
since they do not face the risk of being misled by a noisy signal. Hence, on average,
their demand for the asset is higher.
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Domestic investors’ asset demand decision is affected through two channels in
response to transitory shocks. First, negative (positive) transitory shocks imply low
(high) dividends and hence the domestic investors would like to become net sellers
(buyers) of the asset in order to smooth their consumption over time. This lowers
(increases) the demand of domestic investors, and it is present in the full information
case as well.
The second effect arises due to the capital gain opportunity for domestic in-
vestors who have an informational advantage over their foreign counterparts. When
the asset is undervalued (overvalued) due to the misperceptions of foreign investors,
domestic investors know that this is the result of a transitory shock, and that prices
will eventually correct. As a result, they would like to use the opportunity to buy
(sell) the asset when the prices are low (high) due to the pessimism (optimism) of
foreign investors. We find that on average the capital gain opportunity dominates
the consumption smoothing effect and we find a negative correlation between the




The boom-bust cycles of emerging economies suggest that periods of apparent
prosperity in these countries might contain the seeds of crises. This thesis explores
this possibility using an open economy equilibrium asset pricing model with im-
perfect information in which agents do not know the true state of productivity in
the economy. The model proposed in this thesis can endogeously generate periods
of optimism characterized by booms in asset prices and consumption followed by
sudden reversals, and sensitivity to negative signals that increases with, and arises
from, investor optimism attained prior to the negative signal. These results are due
to the fact that informational frictions generate a disconnect between country fun-
damentals and asset prices. That is, busts (booms) in asset markets can occur even
though the fundamentals of the economy are strong (weak). Asset prices display
persistence in response to transitory shocks since investors cannot perfectly iden-
tify the underlying state of productivity. Due to the additional uncertainty created
by informational frictions, the volatility of the emerging economy’s consumption
increases by 2 percentage points compared to the full information scenario. In ad-
dition, periods with high levels of optimism are more likely to be associated with
current account deficits than periods of pessimism.
In addition, this thesis quantifies the signal-to-noise ratios of a typical emerg-
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ing market economy and a developed economy and establishes that informational
frictions are more prevalent for emerging markets. Based on this difference, we
show that emerging markets are more likely to experience booms and busts due to
misperceptions of investors. Also, these cycles tend to last longer and have larger
magnitudes compared to those of the U.S.
Although the informational frictions introduced in this thesis can produce
booms and busts in asset prices and consumption due to shifts in investor confidence,
these booms and busts are short lived and are of about the same size as regular
business cycles. In addition, even though the introduction of imperfect information
provides an improvement in terms of matching the volatility of consumption and
the current account dynamics observed in the data, the model cannot account for
the volatility of asset prices.
The role of informational frictions in understanding emerging market regu-
larities is an area ready for further research. For instance, the model presented in
this thesis endogenously produces sensitivity to negative signals given an exogenous
sequence of positive signals. We could think of producing an endogeous sequence of
positive signals by introducing strategic information manipulation into the model,
especially prevalent during the run-ups to crises. If there is initially some sensitiv-
ity due to short-term and/or dollarized debt, a policymaker might find it optimal
to manipulate or screen the signals to send positive signals. However, this would
come at a cost because, by taking out the negative signals and sending only posi-
tive ones, the sensitivity of the economy to a sudden downward adjustment would
increase. This would create a feedback mechanism in which the policymaker, con-
54
cerned about the country’s ability to continue borrowing in international markets,





Throughout this section, we assume that i, j ∈ {L,H} and i 6= j.
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote the prior Pr(zt = z
i|Iut−1) = pt(i) and the Normal density function
f(dt|zt = zi) = f(i) for i ∈ {L,H}.
Priors:
Evolution of pt(i) is characterized by:
pt(i) =
pt−1(i)f(i)Pii + [1− pt−1(i)]f(j)Pji
pt−1(i)f(i) + [1− pt−1(i)]f(j) .
• pt(i) = 1 ⇔ pt−1(i)f(i)Pii +[1−pt−1(i)]f(j)Pji = pt−1(i)f(i)+[1−pt−1(i)]f(j)
and pt−1(i)f(i) + [1− pt−1(i)]f(j) 6= 0. Given P >> 0 (see Assumption), the
first condition is satisfied iff
pt−1(i) = 0 and f(j) = 0 or
pt−1(i) = 1 and f(i) = 0, both of which violate the second condition.
• pt(i) = 0 ⇔ f(j)Pji + pt−1(i)[f(i)Pii − f(j)Pji] = 0 and pt−1(i)f(i) + [1 −
pt−1(i)]f(j) 6= 0. The first condition is satisfied iff
f(j) = 0 and f(i)Pii = f(j)Pji. These two hold iff f(j) = 0 and f(i) = 0,
in which case the second condition above does not hold.
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f(j) = 0 and pt−1 = 0. In this case, second condition is again violated.
See Liptser and Shiryayev (1977) Ch. 9 and David (1997) for the proof of entrance






pt−1(i)f(i) + [1− pt−1(i)]f(j) .
Clearly, all terms on the right hand side of the equation are positive: p > 0 (the
proof above) and f > 0 (Normal distribution).
Proof of Proposition 2
First Argument: We need to show that ∂φ(z̃t,.)
∂z̃t
> 0 for ∀ z̃t. Denote the
posterior probabilities Pr(zt = z
i|IUt ) = γt and f(dt+1|zt = zi) = f(i). We start
with expressing γt+1 as a function of γt:
γt+1 =
[γtPii + (1− γt)Pji]f(i)















Remember that z̃t = γtz
i + (1 − γt)zj, so we can calculate the first and the third
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expressions in the above equation:
∂z̃t+1
∂γt+1




zi − zj . (A-3)






{[γtPii + (1− γt)Pji]f(i) + [1− γtPii − (1− γt)Pji]f(j)}2 . (A-4)
Plug in Equations (A-3) and (A-4) into Equation (A-2). To complete the proof, we
need to establish f(zi), f(zj) > 0 and Pii > Pji. f(z
i), f(zj) > 0 for ∀zi, zj since the
Normal distribution is unbounded. Pii > Pji follows from Assumption 2.3.














Denote A = Pij + γ(Pii − Pji). Then we can rewrite Equation (A-1):
γt+1 =
Af(i)





































We know the first expression from Equation (A-2). The second expression can be





(1 + [(1− A)/A][f(j)/f(i)])2 . (A-9)











Proof of Proposition 3
Assume zt = z
i without loss of generality. Write:







Since IIt includes the history of all variables as well as the distributions govern-
ing them, and since the informed agents use their information rationally, we have
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E[z̃t+1|IIt ] = E[z̃t+1]. This implies {E[E[z̃t+1|IIt ] − z̃t+1]}2 = 0. To complete the
proof, we need to show that {E[E[z̃t+1|IUt ]− z̃t+1]}2 > 0. Write
{E[E[z̃t+1|IUt ]− z̃t+1]}2 = {E[E[z̃t+1|IUt ]|IIt ]− E[z̃t+1|IIt ]}2.
And write the expression for E[z̃t+1|IUt ] denoting posterior probabilities Pr(zt =
zi|IUt ) = γt:








Combine Equation (A-10), Equation (A-11), and Pij = 1− Pii to write:







Clearly, {E[z̃t+1|IUt ]− E[z̃t+1|IIt ]}2 ≥ 0 with equality iff
• γt = 1 or
• Pjj = Pij or
• φ(z̃t, zi + η) = φ(z̃t, zj + η)
Proposition 1 establishes that γ ∈ (0, 1), which rules out condition 1. Condition
2 does not hold by assumption (see text). Finally, condition 3 is violated because
zL 6= zH (see text) and φ(., .) is monotonically increasing in its second argument.
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